In different disciplines such as philosophy o f mind, dynamical systems theory, and connec tionism the term 'em ergence' has different jobs to perform. Therefore, various concepts of em ergence are developed and examined. While weaker versions are compatible with prop erty reductionism, stronger versions are not. Within philosophy of mind, particularly within the qualia debate there is a need for a strong notion of emergence, while in discussions of emergent properties of connectionist nets or of dynamical systems one can do with weaker notions of emergence.
Introduction
In addition to having various technical uses, the term 'em ergence' also has a use in ordinary lan guage. Thus, sometimes people use the expression 'the emergence of x' just to m ean that x has ap peared or that x has come up. The term 'em er gence' is used in this way in book titles such as "The Em ergence of Symbols" (Bates, 1979) and "The Em ergence of Probability" (Hacking, 1975) . Of course, one could speak about 'the emergence of animals with brains' or about 'the emergence of robots' in this sense of 'em ergence'. However, I will not focus on this ordinary use of 'em ergence' in what follows. Instead, I will focus on the techni cal uses of 'em ergence'.
In most technical uses, 'em ergent' denotes a sec ond order property of certain first order properties (or structures), namely, the first order properties that are emergent. However, it is controversial what the criteria are by which emergent properties are to be distinguished from non-emergent prop erties. Some criteria are very strong, so that few, if any, properties count as emergent. O ther criteria are inflationary in that they count many, if not all, system properties as emergent. One of the conse-quences of this controversy is a great confusion about what is really m eant by an 'em ergent prop erty', when this term is used in such different disci plines as theories of self-organization, philosophy of mind, dynamical systems theory, or connec tionism.
Therefore, the second section of this article is intended to discuss, in a systematic way, several theories and concepts of emergence of different strengths. It will be shown that the weaker ver sions are compatible with property reductionism. In contrast, stronger versions are incompatible with property reductionism. Also, the im portant distinction between synchronic and diachronic theories of emergence is developed within this sec tion.
In the third section, I examine the different con cepts of emergence, distinguished in section 2 , as they apply to several natural and artificial systems. It will become evident that the concepts perform very different jobs, and so, one needs to be clear about which concept of emergence one wants to employ. For example, within philosophy of mind, particularly within the qualia debate there is a need for a strong notion of emergence, while in discussions of em ergent properties of connectionist nets or of dynamical systems one can be content with weaker notions of emergence.
'Em ergent' is not only attributed to properties in a strict sense, but also to dispositions, behavior, and structures. To simplify my presentation, I will use the concept of a property in a wide sense to apply to dispositions (e.g., being breakable) and behavior: Of a system which behaves such and such, one can always say it has the property (or disposition) to behave such and such. I will, how ever, discuss em ergent structures separately. As we will see, they are particularly im portant for the in terpretation of dynamical systems and connectionist nets.
Weak Emergence, Synchronic Emergence, and Diachronic Emergence
There are three theories among the different varieties of emergentism deserving particular in terest: synchronic emergentism, diachronic em er gentism, and a weak version of emergentism. For synchronic emergentism the timeless relationship between a system's property and its microstruc ture, i.e. the arrangem ent and the properties of the system's parts, is in the center of interest. For such a theory, a property of a system is taken to be emergent, if it is irreducible, i.e., if it is not reduci ble to the arrangem ent and the properties of the system's parts. In contrast, diachronic em er gentism is mainly interested in predictability of novel properties. For such a theory, those proper ties are em ergent that could not have been pre dicted in principle before their first instantiation. By the way, these two stronger versions of em er gentism are not independent of each other, since irreducible properties are eo ipso unpredictable in principle before their first appearance. Hence, synchronically em ergent properties are diachronically emergent, too, but not vice versa.
Both stronger versions of emergentism are based on a common 'weak' theory, which at the present pervades emergentist theorizing mainly in connectionism and theories of self-organization. Its three basic features -the thesis of physical m o nism , the thesis of systemic (or collective) proper ties, and the thesis of synchronic determinism -are compatible with reductionist approaches without any problems. The stronger versions of em er gentism can be developed from weak emergentism by adding further theses.
Weak emergentism
The first feature of contem porary theories of emergence -the thesis of physical monism -is a thesis about the nature of systems that have em er gent properties (or structures). The thesis says that the bearers of emergent properties (or structures) consist of material parts only. According to the thesis, all possible candidates for em ergent proper ties, such as, e.g., being alive or being in a mental state, are instantiated only by material systems with a sufficiently complex physical m icrostruc ture. It excludes all vitalistic positions which hold that properties like being alive can be instantiated only by a compound consisting of an organism and some supernatural entity, e.g. an entelechy or an elan vital} Thus, all substance-dualistic positions are rejected; for they base having cognitive states on supernatural bearers such as a res cogitans? Hence, the thesis of physical monism denies that there are any supernatural components responsi ble for a system's having emergent properties. Par ticularly, this means that living or cognitive sys tems -whether artificial or natural -consist of the same parts as lifeless objects of nature. There is no reason to suppose that there are some spe cific components that belong just to those systems which are alive or able to cognize, but are missing in systems which are lifeless or unable to cognize. Instead, it is nothing but specific constellations of physico-chemical processes that show vital be havior or have mental qualitites.
(i) Physical monism. Entities existing or coming into being in the universe consist solely of material parts. Likewise, properties, disposi tions, behaviors, or structures classified as emergent are instantiated by systems con sisting exclusively of physical parts.
Embracing a naturalistic position, emergentists subscribe to a scientific empiricist position, but in so doing, they do not subscribe to reductionism.
While the first thesis puts the discussion of emergent properties and structures within the framework of a physicalistic naturalism, the se cond thesis delimits the type of properties that arê Supernatural' properties are meant to be hyperphysi cal, i.e., as independent from (physical) nature and their laws.
2 In the history of emergentism, however, there were theories of emergence that did not claim the thesis of physical m onism ; instead, they took mental or neutral building blocks as fundamental (cf. Broad, 1925, p. 610-6 5 3 ). Anyway, the thesis of physical monism is not questioned by main stream debate today. possible candidates for emergents. It is the thesis of systemic properties.
This thesis is based on the assumption that gene ral properties of complex systems fall into two dif ferent classes:3 (i) properties which some of the system's parts also have, and (ii) properties that none of the system 's parts have. Examples of the first class are properties such as being extended and having a velocity; sometimes such properties are called hereditary properties (however, 'heredi tary' is not used in a biological sense). Examples of properties in the second class are walking, re producing, breathing and having a sensation of pain. These properties are called systemic or col lective properties.
(ii) Systemic properties. Em ergent properties are systemic properties. A property is a systemic property if and only if a system possesses it, but no part of the system possesses it.4
Sometimes systemic properties are charac terized as 'novel' properties, only by virtue of be ing systemic.5 However, this does not attribute any tem poral dimension; instead it characterizes a 'timeless' systematic relationship: in comparison to the properties of the system's parts, the system's properties are 'new '. Thus, one could, if one liked, distinguish betw een diachronic and synchronic novelties. However, I prefer to characterize sys tematically novel properties as does the thesis of systemic properties, only diachronic novelties in time should be characterized by a thesis of novelty (see below).
It should be uncontroversial that both artificial and natural systems with systemic properties exist. Those, who would deny their existence would have to claim that all of a system's properties are 'he reditary' properties, that is to say, that they are instantiated already by some of the system's parts. Countless examples refute such a claim.
3 General properties are properties of a general type, such as having a weight, or being liquid; they are not specific properties, such as having a weight of 154.5 pounds or being liquid by a temperature of 1200 °C.
4 The distinction between systemic and non-systemic properties goes back to Broad (1933, p. 268 While the first thesis restricts the type of parts out of which systems having em ergent properties may be built, and while the second thesis charac terizes in more detail the type of properties that might be em ergent, the third thesis specifies the type of relationship that holds between a system's m icro-structure and its em ergent properties as a relationship of synchronic determination:
(iii) Synchronic determination. A system's proper ties and dispositions to behave depend nomologically on its micro-structure, that is to say, on its parts' properties and their arrange ment. There can be no difference in the sys temic properties without there being some differences in the properties of the system's parts or their arrangem ent.6
Vollmer illustrates this case with an example from chemistry: The system 'graphite' consists of carbon atoms arranged in honeycomb layers. However, a tetrahedral arrangem ent of the same atomic parts constitutes a different system, e.g., 'diam ond', with different systemic properties. By choosing different atomic building blocks, but the same structure type, again we obtain another sys tem, e.g. 'silicon'. In each of these examples the systemic properties are nomologically dependent on properties of the system's parts and their ar rangem ent (cf. to Vollmer, 1988, p. 93) . Anyone who denies the thesis of the system's properties synchronic determ ination either has to admit 'free floating' properties, i.e., properties that are not bound to the properties and arrangem ent of its b earer's parts, or she has to suppose that some other factors, in this case non-natural factors, are responsible for the different dispositions of sys tems that are identical in their microstructure. In the case m entioned above, she would have to ad-6 In recent debate, the thesis of synchronic determina tion is som etim es stated in a less stronger version as the thesis of m ereological supervenience, which claims that a system s's properties (or dispositions) supervene on its parts' properties and their arrangement. Then, too, there is no difference in the systemic properties without differences in the part's properties or their arrangement (see Stephan, 1994 , p. 109). The thesis of mereological supervenience, however, is weaker than the thesis of synchronic determination, since it does not claim the dependence of the system 's properties from its micro-structure, it only claims their covari ance.
mit, for example, that there may exist objects that have the same parts in the same arrangem ent as diamonds, but which lack the diam ond's hardness, that may have hardness 2 instead of hardness 1 0 on the Mohs-scale. This seems to be totally im plausible. Equally beyond thought is that there may exist two micro-identical organisms, one is vi able and the other not. In the case of mental phe nomena, opinions may be more controversial; but one thing seems to be clear: anyone who believes, e.g., that two creatures identical in micro-structure could be such that one is colorblind while the other can distinguish colors in the ordinary way, does not hold a naturalistic-physicalistic position.7
Weak emergentism as sketched so far comprises the minimal conditions for em ergent properties. It is the common base for all stronger theories of emergence. M oreover -and this is a reason for distinguishing it as a theory in its own right -it is held not only by some philosophers (e.g., Bunge, and Vollmer), but also by cognitive scientists (e.g., Hopfield, Rosch, Varela, and R um elhart) in ex actly its weak form. The three features of weak emergentism -(i) the thesis of physical monism, (ii) the thesis of systemic properties, and (iii) the thesis of synchronic determination however, are compatible with contem porary reductionist ap proaches without further ado. Particularly, this is true because recent reductionist approachescontrary to older variants -take into consider ation the system's structures too. Thus, a system 's systemic property just being non-additive does not by itself make it irreducible. Some champions of weak emergentism credit the compatibility of 'em ergence' and 'reducibility' as one of its merits com pared to stronger versions of emergentism (e.g., Bunge, 1977) .
Synchronic emergentism
We come to the essential features of more am bi tious theories of emergence, the theses of irreducibility (or non-deducibility) and of unpredictability of certain systemic properties. These theses are 7 However, similar considerations hold for preposi tional attitudes only, as long as one does not subscribe to externalism, that is to say, if one does not claim that, e.g., the content o f a belief depends essentially on the nature of the referents of the believer's thoughts and concepts.
closely connected: Irreducible systemic properties are eo ipso unpredictable, in principle, before their first appearance. But besides irreducible proper ties, there also seem to be properties that can't be predicted before their first appearance on other grounds. Therefore, the thesis of unpredictability is more complex than the thesis of irreducibility of systemic properties. Thus, it is reasonable to start with a discussion of the thesis of irreducibility, which is easier to analyze, and a discussion of syn chronic emergentism. B road's attem pt to explicate a (strong) theory of emergence may count as downright classical; it reads:
"Put in abstract terms the em ergent theory as serts that there are certain wholes, composed (say) of constituents A , B, and C in a relation R to each other; that all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A , B, and C in relations of the same kind as R have certain characteristic proper ties; that A , B, and C are capable of occuring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not the same kind as R\ and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A,B,C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from the most com plete knowl edge of the properties of A , B, and C in isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R (A ,B ,C )" (1925, 61) .
According to B road's definition a systemic property, which is supposed to be nomologically dependent on its system's micro-structure (by the thesis of synchronic determ ination), is called irre ducible and therefore emergent, if and only if it cannot be deduced from the arrangem ent of its system's parts and the properties they have 'iso lated' or in other (more simple) systems.8
Although, prima facie, it looks as if B road's pro posal gives us a clear and distinct explication of what it is for a systemic property to be irreducible (or non-deducible), a further look reveals that two different kinds of irreducibility having quite dif 8 Properties that might be ascribed to a system 's part 'in isolation' are, according to Broad, properties that depend essentially on the micro-structure o f the part, while external factors, such as the part's arrangement and its neighboring parts, can be seen as alm ost irrele vant for the part's having these properties (cf. 1919, p. 112 f.). ferent consequences are concealed. The failure to keep apart the two kinds of irreducibility has m ud dled the recent debate about the emergence of properties. To m ake things clearer, I shall first dis cuss when a systemic property is reducible. For this to be the case, two conditions must be fulfilled: The first is that from the behavior of the system's parts alone it must follow that the system has some property P. The second condition demands that the behavior the system's parts show when they are part of the system follows from the behavior they show in isolation or in simpler systems than the system in question. If both conditions are ful filled, the behavior of the system's parts in other contexts reveals what systemic properties the ac tual system has. That is to say, those properties are reducible. Since both conditions are independent from each other, two totally different possibilities for the occurrence of irreducible systemic proper ties will result: (a) a systemic property P of a sys tem S is irreducible, if it does not follow, even in principle, from the behavior of the system's parts that S has property P; and (b) a systemic property P of a system S is irreducible, if it does not follow, even in principle, from the behavior of the sys tem 's parts in simpler constellations than S how they will behave in S.
Thus, a necessary requirem ent for a systemic property to be reducible is that its being 'instanti ated ' has to follow from the behavior of the sys tem 's parts. In other words: From the behavior of the system 's parts it should follow that the system has all characteristic features that are essential for having the systemic property. Broad, for example, takes this condition, which is enclosed in the first criterion for reducibility, to be always fulfilled in the case of the characteristic properties of chemi cal com pounds and viable organisms. Their prop erties might be irreducible only by violation of the second criterion, what means that from the beha vior of the system 's parts in other (simpler) sys tems it would not follow how they will behave in the actual system. In contrast, he claims that the irreducibility of secondary qualities (e.g., the color or taste of certain objects) and phenomenal quali ties (e.g., the 'how it is for us' when experiencing 9 A s we will see, one type of irreducibility seems to im ply 'downward causation', while the other seems to imply epiphenomenalism. the colors or tastes of those objects) results al ready from a violation of the first condition, since they were neither adequately characterizable by the macroscopic nor by microscopic behavior of the system's parts, even in principle. For, when we say that a certain object is red or a chemical sub stance has the smell of liquid ammonia, we do not mean that the corresponding system's parts behave or move in a certain way. No progress in the sci ences could change this state of affairs in any way. 1 0 Broad has illustrated the fundam ental dis tinction between (behavioral) analyzable and unanalyzable properties by pointing to characteristic properties of organisms and secondary qualities, respectively.
If secondary and phenom enal qualities are not analyzable, 11 even in principle, then there is no prospect that an increase of scientific knowledge will close the gap between physical processes and secondary qualities or between physiological pro cesses and phenom enal states of consciousness (qualia), respectively.
We can now specify more exactly the feature of irreducibility which is central for synchronic em er gence. Its first variant is based on the behavioral unanalyzability of systemic properties. It reads:
(a°) Unanalyzability. Systemic properties which are not behaviorally analyzable -be it microor macro-scopically -are (necessarily) irre ducible.
However, even if secondary and phenom enal qualities belong to the class of unanalyzable prop erties, it does not follow that the specific behavior of the system's parts upon which those qualities supervene is itself not deducible from the behavior those parts show isolated or in other (simpler) sys tems. The irreducibility which results from a viola tion of the first criterion of reducibility does not imply, by itself, a violation of the second criterion of reducibility.
On the other side, however, even analyzable sys temic properties can be irreducible and therefore emergent. This is the case when the second crite rion of reducibility will be violated, i.e., when the behavior of the system's parts does not follow from their behavior in other (simpler) constell ations. Broad thinks that such examples of irreduc ible behavior might occur in chemical compounds and also in organisms. 1 2 His central idea is that the parts of a genuinely novel structure, such as, e.g., an organism in comparison to any inorganic com pound, might behave in a way that is not deducible from the p art's behavior in other structures. Im plicitly, that means that the actual behavior of parts that interact in wholes does not result from their behavior in pairs. 1 3 If the behavior of some system's parts is irreducible in this respect, then all properties that depend nomologically on the behavior of the system 's parts (for example, repro duction) are irreducible too.
Thus, we can specify more precisely the second variant of a systemic property's irreducibility. It is based on the non-deducibility of the behavior of the system's parts:
The specific behavior a system's com ponents within the system is irreducible if it does not follow from the com ponents' behavior in iso lation or in other (simpler) constellations.
A violation of the second criterion of reducibil ity, which is m anifested in the irreducibility of the com ponents' behavior, does not imply, however, a violation of the first criterion of reducibility. Sys temic properties that cannot be reduced because the system's parts' behavior is irreducible might nevertheless be behaviorally analyzable. Hence, the two criteria of reducibility as well as those irreducibilities that are based on the violation of these criteria are independent of each other. Summariz ing, we get from (a0) and (b°) the following m odi fied version of systemic property irreducibility:
(iv) Irreducibility. A systemic property is irreduc ible if (a) it is neither micro-nor macro-scopically behaviorally analyzable, or if (b) the specific behavior of the system's components, over which the systemic property supervenes, does not follow from the com ponent's beha vior in isolation or in other (simpler) constell ations.
Thus, we have to distinguish two totally dif ferent types of irreducibility of systemic proper ties. Equally different seem to be the conse quences that result from them. If a systemic property is irreducible because the behavior of the system's parts, over which the property super venes, is itself irreducible, this seems to imply that we have a case of 'downward causation'. For, if the com ponents' behavior is not reducible to their arrangement and the behavior they show in other (simpler) systems or in isolation, then there seems to exist some 'downward' causal influence from the system itself or from its structure on the beha vior of the system's parts. To be sure, if there would exist such instances of 'downward causa tion' this would not amount to a violation of some widely held assumptions, such as, for example, the principle of the causal closure of the physical do main. Within the physical domain, we would just have to accept additional types of causal influ ences besides the already known basal types of m utual interactions.
In contrast, the occurrence of unanalyzable properties does not imply any kind of downward causation. Systems that have unanalyzable proper ties that depend nomologically on their b earer's micro-structures need not be constituted in a way that amounts to the irreducibility of their com po nents' behavior. Nor is implied that the system 's structure has a downward causal influence on the system's parts. All the more, there is no reason to assume that unanalyzable properties themselves exert a causal influence on the system's parts. R ather it is to ask, how unanalyzable properties might have any causal role to play at all. Since they are not behaviorally analyzable, that is to say, they neither seem to correspond to any 'mecha nism' nor do they seem to result from any 'mecha nism', it is hard to see how they could be causally effective themselves. If, however, one can not see how unanalyzable properties might play a causal role, then, it seems, such properties are epiphenomena.
Diachronic emergentism
In a systematic examination of systemic proper ties that are exemplified in our world -for exam ple, chemical, vital, or mental properties -, the question that arises is whether the properties are reducible. In contrast, their predictability is, so to speak, of no account. Within the scope of 'em er gent evolution', however, importance of the two questions seems the reverse: While the question concerning the reducibility of emerging properties seems less relevant, it is of particular interest what systems and properties might have been predicta ble, at least in principle, before they were actually exemplified. Likewise, predictability of properties that are be expected plays an important role in the developm ent of novel artefacts. Here, however, it is not predictability in principle that matters. What m atters is practical predictability -it's better to know before you make the 'Elch test' whether your newly constructed car will pass it or not. U n foreseen events of this type have little to do, how ever, with emergence in the theoretically interest ing sense.
All diachronic theories of emergence have at bottom a thesis about the occurrence of genuine novelties -properties or structures -in evolution. This thesis excludes at the same time all preformationist positions.
(v) Novelty. In the course of evolution exemplifi cations of 'genuine novelties' occur again and again. Already existing building blocks will develop new constellations; new structures will be formed that constitute new entities with new properties and behaviors.
However, bare addition of the thesis of novelty does not turn a weak theory of emergence into a strong one, since reductive physicalism remains compatible with such a variant of emergentism. Only the addition of the thesis of unpredictability, in principle, of novel properties will lead to stronger forms of diachronic emergentism.
A short consideration shows that systemic prop erties can be unpredictable in principle for two fundamentally different reasons: (i) they can be unpredictable because the micro-structure of the system, which exemplifies the property for the first time in evolution, is unpredictable. For, if the micro-structure of a newly emerging system is un predictable, so are the properties which depend nomologically on it. (ii) However, a property can be unpredictable even though the novel system's micro-structure is predictable. That is the case if the property itself is irreducible: For, if systemic properties are irreducible, then they are unpredict able before their first appearance. This does not preclude that further occurrences of this property might be predicted adequately. Since in the second case criteria for being unpredictable are identical with those for being irreducible, this notion of un predictability will offer no theoretical gains be yond those afforded by the notion of irreducibil ity. 1 4 Let us focus, therefore, on the first case: unpre dictability o f structure. This version of unpredict ability passed almost unnoticed in 'classical' litera ture on emergentism during the 1920s, but because of strong interest in dynamical systems and chaotic processes this notion gains considerable signifi cance.
The structure of new formed systems can itself be unpredictable for several reasons. Thus, belief in an indeterministic universe implies that there 14 A difference in extension between both notions could result only in respect to those properties, which, al though reducible, are not predictable before their first appearance. A reducible property is unpredictable be fore its first appearance if the behavior of the system 's com ponents upon which it supervenes does not follow from their behavior in those systems that exist at the time of prediction. The notion o f unpredictability wid ened in this way would depend, however, in a very contingent way on the chronological order of systems coming into being in evolution. Therefore, such a no tion should not be important in qualifying the notion of emergence.
will be novel, unpredictable structures. However, from an emergentist perspective it would be of no interest, if a new structure's appearance would be unpredictable only because its coming into being is not determ ined, not to mention that most emergentists claim, anyway, that the developm ent of new structures is governed by deterministic laws. But still deterministic formings of new structures can be unpredictable in principle, if they are gov erned by laws which are attributed to determ inis tic chaos.
An essential outcome of the theory of chaos is that there exist -even very simple -m athem ati cal functions, whose own 'behavior' cannot be pre dicted. Only the rise of 'experim ental m athem at ics' on highly efficient com puters has revealed, for example, the properties of various logistic func tions. Their intra-m athem atical unpredictability has to do with an aperiodic behavior of these func tions, by which marginally different initial values of some variable can lead to radically distinct tra jectories of the functions.
A standard example is the logistic function f(x) = |ix (l-x ) for 0 < x < 1. For a param eter with 0 < [i < 4 the logistic function maps the in terval [0,1] onto itself. Of particular interest is, how param eter (i exercises an influence on the long term behavior of the function when iterated repeatedly. For 0 < < 1 the situation is obvious. All initial values of the variable x let the function f(x) approximate the value 0 after sufficiently many iterations, thus, the origin is the attractor. For 1 < (I < 3 exists exactly one attractor A of value A = l -l / [ i : the function balances out on a stable value. If equals 3, the fixed point of the function is 'marginally stable'; convergence is de cidedly slowly -an indication for fundamental change in its behavior. For larger values dynamic becomes considerably complex. In the case of 3 < ^ < 1 + ^6 values oscillate between two fixed points. By increasing \x the attractors of period two will become instable, too. We get a cycle of period four (i.e., after four iterations the values of the function approach in each case the four fixed points). A t 3.56 the period doubles again and be comes eight, at 3.567 it becomes sixteen, and then we get a quickly rising sequence of periods to 32, 64, 128, etc. -vividly one speaks of cascades. At about 3.58, this sequence comes to an end. The period has doubled itself infinitely many times.
Hereafter, predictions do not seem to be possible. Marginally different initial values x lead to radi cally different trajectories of the iterated function. Values jump pell-mell, convergence and diver gence are not discernible: chaos dominates.
Thus, it looks as if just the most exact science of all has led us back to one of the starting points of emergentism. Whereas -after pioneering suc cesses in chemistry and physics -we today do not count properties and dispositions of chemical com pounds any more among synchronic em ergent phenomena, examinations of deterministic chaos suggest the existence of systems that might de velop structures that are unpredictable in principle and thus might show structure-emergent behavior.
Of course, one could argue that a Laplacean cal culator could predict correctly even chaotic pro cesses. W hether or not this could actually be the case, however, is not settled yet. It depends mainly on the question of what kind of inform ation we allow such a creature of phantasy to have. For ex ample, in A lexander's considerations (cf. 1920, ii, pp. 72 f., 328) Laplace's calculator knows several earlier states of the whole world and, in addition, all natural laws that govern changes in the world. He seems to be able to extrapolate from his knowledge of all events that have occurred in the universe so far even the course of chaotic pro cesses. But on what basis could he do that? Since chaotic processes are aperiodic, one can not deter mine definitely from those processes that have oc curred up to a certain time the exact formula which would describe their further course. Even if the further course of the world is governed by deterministic laws, it does not follow from the earlier events and states alone, by which laws it is governed. Entirely different continuations seem to be compatible with the earlier course of the world. Therefore, even a Laplacean calculator could fail in his predictions. If one grants, however, that he knows all details of earlier world states -up to infinitely many digits -, and if one grants that he knows a priori which processes are governed by which specific chaotic laws, then, of course, he would be able to predict the forming of structures that are governed by these laws. open whether or not it is plausible to ascribe such a knowledge to such a fabulous creature. How ever, we can preclude that foretellers of our men tal capacities have these abilities, and suppose that where chaos exists, structures exist that are unpre dictable in principle, and that is to say, that there will be structure emergence in our sense.
(vi) Structure-unpredictability. The rise of novel structures is unpredictable in principle, if their form ation is governed by laws of deter ministic chaos. Likewise, any novel properties that are instantiated by those structures are unpredictable in principle.
Summing up, it may be said a systemic property is unpredictable in principle before its first appear ance, if (i) it is irreducible, or if (ii) the structure which instantiates it, is unpredictable in principle before its first formation. Although unpredictabil ity of structure always implies unpredictability of properties instantiated by the structure, it does not thereby imply the irreducibility of the properties instantiated by the structure. As far as that goes, unpredictability in principle of systemic properties is entirely compatible with their being reducible to the m icro-structure of the system that instanti ates them.
Synopsis
The following figure depicts the logical relation ship that holds between different versions of emergentism.
Weak diachronic emergentism results from weak emergentism by adding a tem poral dimension in the form of the thesis of novelty. Both versions are compatible with reductive physicalism. Weak theories of emergence are used today mainly in cognitive sciences, particularly for characterization of systemic properties of connectionist nets, and in theories of self-organization. Synchronic emer gentism results from weak emergentism by adding the thesis of irreducibility. This version of em er gentism is im portant for the philosophy of mind, particularly for debating nonreductive physicalism and qualia. It is not compatible with reductive physicalism any more. Strong diachronic emer gentism only differs from synchronic emergentism because of the tem poral dimension in the thesis of novelty. In contrast, structure emergentism is en tirely independent of synchronic emergentism. It results from weak emergentism by adding the the sis of structure-unpredictability. Although struc ture emergentism emphasizes the boundaries of prediction within physicalistic approaches, it is compatible with reductive physicalism, and so it is far weaker than synchronic emergentism. Theories of deterministic chaos (in dynamical systems) can be acknowledged as a type of structure emer- gentism. Likewise, its perspective is im portant for evolutionary research. In comparison to the above mentioned versions of emergentism the synthetic position of strong structure emergentism has no equivalent in recent discussion. Most im portant from a theoretical point of view are weak emer gentism, synchronic emergentism, and diachronic structure emergentism.
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Emergence in the Qualia Debate, in Connectionism, and in Synergetics
Let us turn to some specific cases to consider how the different concepts of emergence are ap plicable. We will see that in one of the central de bates within philosophy of mind, namely the de bate about the nature of qualia, there is need for a strong notion of emergence such as that of syn chronic emergentism. In contrast, in connectionism and synergetics weaker notions of emergence are employed.
Emergence in the debate over whether qualia are physical
In recent debate about qualia, 1 6 Nagel, Block, Jackson, Levine, and McGinn, among others, have argued in one way or another that qualitative mental phenom ena are not reducible to physical or functional states, respectively. If their argu ments succeed, they imply em ergentist or substance-dualistic positions. Most interesting and powerful seems to be Levine's so-called 'explana tory gap'-argument, which I will consider closely in the following.
Levine starts with comparing two statements, namely (i) 'pain is the firing of C-fibers', and (ii) 'heat is the motion of m olecules'. The decisive dif ference between the two identity statements, ac cording to Levine, is that the second is fully ex planatory, while the first is not: 1 7 "there is a 'gap' in the explanatory im port of these statem ents" (1983, p. 357). The second identity statem ent is as sumed to be 'fully explanatory', because knowl edge of natural laws helps us understand why the motion of molecules has exactly the causal role usually ascribed to heat. In doing so, it is presup posed -and this is of great importance -that the macro-physical concept of heat can be fully explicated by heat's causal role.
" [Statement (ii) ] is explanatory in the sense that our knowledge of chemistry and physics makes in telligible how it is that something like the motion of molecules could play the causal role we associ ate with heat. Furtherm ore, antecedent to our dis covery of the essential nature of heat, its causal role [...] exhausts our notion of it. Once we under stand how this causal role is carried out there is nothing more we need to understand" (1983, p. 357).
In other words: statem ent (ii) is fully explana tory because some system's property of heat is re ducible in respect to the motions of molecules, and so far it is not emergent. On the other hand, the reason for statem ent (i) not being fully explana tory is, according to Levine, that the notion of pain (as are notions of other phenomenal states) is not exhausted by the causal role of pain. The decisive point is that there is no reason to believe that fir ing of C-fibers fits better to typical pain experi ences than to any other phenom enal experience.
In a series of articles, Levine and Hardin argued about the 'explanatory gap'-argum ent's core thesis by concentrating on experiences of colors (see Levine, 1983; and Hardin, 1987; ). Levine's last 'move' is the following:18 "If inverted qualia are possible, then the ques tion why red things look reddish and not greenish has no adequate answer in physical/functional terms. Whereas, if inverted qualia are not possible, then the question why red things look reddish, and not some other (perhaps unimaginable) way or no way at all, still has no adequate answer in physical/ functional terms. An explanatory gap persists" (1991, p. 39).
Levine here seems to refer to objections that were originally directed at functionalism, namely the 'inverted qualia'-argument, and the 'absent In response to Levine, Hardin has tried to make clear which explanatory gap he thinks is closable at least in principle, and which one must be left open. If we assume that color experiences are phe nomenally simple and unstructered, then it looks difficult indeed to tie them explanatorily to physi ological processes. In fact, however, we should acknowledge that at least some colors show struc tures that fit well to neuronal processes. "We would for example, expect the neural pro cess associated with orange to be relatively more complex than the process associated with red, and in fact, expect that the 'red-making' process would be in some fashion incorporated in the 'orangemaking' process on the grounds that perceived redness is an ingredient in perceived orangeness" (1991, p. 44).
Hardin concedes, however, that it is far easier to explain the difference between experiencing red and experiencing green than to explain experienc ing red or experiencing green themselves. We could develop an understanding of the differences between both experiences without being able to explain each experience in itself. Thus, Hardin 19 Inverted qualia would exist, e.g., if things we call 'red' look to somebody else the way things look we call 'green', and vice versa. Qualia are called absent, if a system has no phenomenal experiences at all, al though it shares with us functional descriptions of phenomenal states. See, for example, Block (1978; 1980) . If one claims that a reduction that is explanatory is impossible in principle, as is claimed for qualia, that does not imply a failure of the second task. What is implied is a failure, in principle, of the first task. Apparently, phenomenal properties cannot be individuated by their causal roles: "W hat seems to be responsible for the explanatory gap, then, is the fact that our concepts of qualitative character do not represent, at least in terms of their psycho logical contents, causal roles. Reduction is explan atory when by reducing an object or property we reveal the mechanisms by which the causal role constitutive of that object or property is realized. M oreover, this seems to be the only way that a reduction could be explanatory. Thus, to the extent that there is an element in our concept of qualita tive character that is not captured by features of its causal role, to that extent it will escape the ex planatory net of a physicalistic reduction" (1993, p. 134). Thus, Levines synchronic qualia-emergentism is based on two theses:
(1) The reduction of a systemic property P is ex planatory if and only if the realization base exhausts exactly the causal role which is con stitutive of P.
(2) Phenomenal properties (or states) are not fully graspable by the features of their causal role.21 20 In the meantime, others have suggested further ways to close the 'explanatory gap'. See, for example, Kirk (1996) and Kurthen (1996) . 21 Notice the analogies between Levine's theses and the criteria for irreducibility in the section above. Levine's interpretation would allow, therefore, to treat synchronic qualia-emergentism as a physi calistic position. As things stand, however, physicalists have turned the tables. They demand that genuine physicalist positions may not leave out ex planatorily anything (cf. Beckerm ann, 1996b and Horgan, 1993). According to this criterion, qualiaemergentism can not be seen as a physicalistic po sition any more. One reason for the physicalists' becoming more fastidious might be that emergentists seem to face a hopeless dilemma when confronted with the problem of mental causa-22 Cf. to Beckermann, Kirk, Levine and Rey (all 1996) . tion.23 In the presence of this, the challenge for the physicalist to manage those 'portions' of qualia that escape individuation by causal roles seem to be negligible compared to the emergentist's prob lems with mental causation. For, if qualitative states can not be individuated via causal roles, then it is questionable whether they can play any causal role at all.
Synergetics and emergentism
Synergetics -an interdisciplinary theory of co operation -addresses an original subject of em er gentism: the com ing into being o f novel systemic properties. Particularly, it is concerned with quali tative changes in a system's behavior that have be come instable by change of specific controlling parameters (see Haken, 1996 , pp. 587 and 593). Synergetics' starting point is the observation that both in animate and in inanimate nature, there ex ist numerous systems that spontaneously form by themselves -that is to say, in a self-organizing way -new structures. Classical examples are the entirely novel light of lasers in comparison with that of ordinary lamps,24 or the structure form a tion of slime mold.25 Both examples and many similar ones have in common that small distur bances of control parameters give rise to instable states out of which new structures emerge by pro cesses of self-organization. The new structures often instantiate qualitatively new properties com pared to those the system instantiated before -a subject that has been in the center of emergentists' considerations.
Synergetics looks for the regularities that lie be hind various self-organizing systems which usually 23 The seeming dilemma, however, is not hopeless for the emergentist, as I argued in "Armchair Arguments Against Emergentism" (1997). 24 When only a small amount of energy is pumped into the device, the laser operates as a lamp. Then, its main elements, namely specific atoms, emit lightwaves of about 3 m coherence length independently of each other. If the pump power is increased to a certain threshold, the atoms oscillate in phase and emit a giant wavetrack of about 300,000 km length. 25 Slime mold (Dictyostelium disciodeum) normally ex ists in the form of single amoebic cells. If nutriment runs short, the cells assemble at a certain place, pile up, and then differentiate into spores and stalk cells. Slime mold can move then as a whole. It wriggles on the ground like a snake (cf. Haken, 1988 , p. 9 9 -1 0 2 ).
are studied by such distinct disciplines as physics, chemistry, or biology. Such as theories of em er gence synergetics has as a characteristic feature a naturalistic attitude: It takes it for granted that processes which lead to new structures are trig gered and maintained by the system's parts' coop eration, and not by external 'organizers' or 'super natural' entities. In contrast to stronger versions of emergentism, synergetics claims that formation of new structures as well as properties instantiated by them can be explained and forecasted by refer ence to the parts' cooperation. Hence, from a syn ergetic point of view neither should new arising structures be seen as structure em ergent, nor should properties instantiated by these structures be seen as synchronic emergent. Of central significance for synergetics are such notions as 'order param eter' or 'enslaving' intro duced by Haken himself. Quantities that are seen as order parameters are thought to do a double job: On the one hand, they are used to describe very com plex processes of self-organization in a simple but yet adequate way; on the other hand, they are used to explain causally the ongoing pro cesses (cf. 1996, p. 588, and 1987, p. 139 f.). Haken's 'thesis of description' ( t d ) is supported by numer ous examples, and by a mathematical formalism developed in (1983):26 ( t d ) By specifying the behavior of order param e ters of a system, the system's behavior is ade quately characterized. Instead of describing a system's behavior by specifying the beha vior of all its single parts, it is sufficient just to specify the behavior of few relevant or der parameters.
Thus, the state of a laser can be described, in principle, in two ways: first, on a microscopic level by specifying the individual states of all electrons, or second, by exploiting that laser's light has come up to a m acroscopic state. Here, a far smaller amount of information, e.g., wavelength and am 26 To give some examples, order parameters are, accord ing to Haken, prevailing light waves in a laser which 'force' all emitted electrons to oscillate in their way (cf. 1988, p. ( e p ) Order parameters enslave a system's indivi dual parts, that is to say, they determine the parts' behavior.
The principle of 'enslaving' a system's parts by order parameters is a specific case of downward causation: O rder param eters are macroscopic quantities. They refer to states or properties of the whole system. As systemic quantities, they influ ence the system's part's behavior. Since Haken supposes that order param eters emerge only from cooperation of the system's parts, he prefers to use the notion 'circular causality' to characterize the presumed mutual interaction between system's parts and order parameters.
The term 'enslaving principle' is not to be understood as a metaphor, although H aken's dic tion is full of anthropomorphisms and metaphors when he undertakes to illustrate it. Originally, it is introduced and justified within a presentation of a mathematical formalism that is developed to de scribe adequately processes of self-organization (see 1983, p. 2 0 8 ff.). In his own interpretation of the mathematical formalism, Haken, however, jumps from a purely structural reading to a causal reading of the mathematical relations -a clear case of the 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc'-fallacy.27 For, the functionally described relation of succes sion between order parameters and system's parts, does not warrant an extrapolation to a causal rela tion between order parameters and system's parts. H aken's causal theses appear rather odd when applied to order parameters within the scope of psycho-physical theories or approaches in the so cial sciences. To sum up, we can say that synergetics does nei ther establish a strong nor a novel version of em er gentism. It does not treat novel structures that are formed at instabilities as unpredictable and thus as structure em ergent.29 Nor does it treat systemic 27 From a mathematical point of view Haken's approach just means that solutions of differential equations de pend essentially upon slowly changing quantities, the order parameters, while fast-moving quantities can be neglected. A more detailed presentation of Haken's mathematical considerations is given in Stephan (1998, section 18.1.) . 28 See also Haken and Haken-Krell (1989, p. 134) . 29 Thus, Haken says, "it is exactly calculable which col lective motion will win in the end" (1988, p. 49, my translation) . It is only that breakings of symmetry de properties or macroscopic quantities such as order parameters as irreducible and thus synchronically emergent. Instead, synergetics attempts to explain the coming into being and persistence of novel structures and their properties by processes of self organization. M oreover, synergetics does not es tablish a scientifically based kind of downward causation, since a reading of the mathematical for malism that jumps from a sequential relation to a downward causal relation is not warranted.
E m ergence in connectionism
In the last decade, connectionism has received great attention in cognitive science. Its core idea is to assume a network of elementary units that have a certain level of activation. Units are con nected with each other. Units whose activation ex ceeds a certain threshold, can activate or inhibit other units according to certain weights that spec ify prevailing connections.
To see to what extent emergentist considera tions are relevant for connectionism, I shall first examine more closely the param eters that specify a connectionist net. Each net is determined essen tially by three factors: (i) by the number of units and connecting links which hold between them; (ii) by the function that determines the level of activation for each unit; and (iii) by the rule that determines how connection weights will change.
In each case the number of units and the links between them are fixed; they make up, so to speak, the 'skeleton' of a network which is static under ordinary circumstances: neither the number of units nor the structure of their links will change. A system's actual dynamic results from the possi bility of modifying the weights of its internal con necting links. From a macroscopic point of view, these continuous processes of accomodation can be seen as learning procedures. Thus, a connectionist net 'learns' by locally determined changes of its connections' weights, and not by adding some further propositions to its data base. It's a big challenge for connectionist researchers to con strue nets that are able to optimize link weights by themselves in a 'training phase' such that they are able to produce given outputs. When a net is pend on very small deviations, and so are often unpre dictable for practical reasons. Since this example was to illustrate schemata for mation they refrained from training the net; in stead, they set the link weights in advance.
By way of calculation there are 240 possible bi nary states in which the system could potentially settle. But actually, only five maxima which corre spond to five specific room types crystallized. For example, by beginning a cycle with the 'oven'-unit, the system successively adds the units for 'ceiling', 'coffe-cup', 'sink' and 'refrigerator'. A fter 400 up dates all features of a prototype kitchen were acti vated (see Rum elhart et al., 1986, p. 25). Complete schematas for kitchen, bathroom, office, livingand bedroom could be activated by starting with one of these room 's characteristic features, respec tively. Besides these main schemata several 'sub schem ata' are hidden. They can be activated by activating, e.g., 'bed'-and 'desk'-unit together. Then we get a schema of, say, a student's room.
Behavior and properties of connectionist nets give rise to emergentist considerations in many ways. Three aspects should be discerned: first, connectionist nets obviously have systemic properties, that is they have properties their parts do not have. Thus, a n et's properties are at least weakly emergent. However, it remains to be determined whether systemic properties of nets are emergent 30 The term 'schemata' refers as related terms as 'scripts', or 'frames' to coherent structures of knowl edge, which are assumed to be fundamental for rea sonable interactions with the world.
in a strong sense, namely synchronically emergent. Secondly, many systemic properties of nets seem to be emergent in a 'phenomenological' way. By this, I mean that the properties appear, or come into being by themselves -as is the case with the five room s' schemata -, if nets get adequate stim uli. These facts of the case are referred to in E n g lish by the word 'em ergent' in its ordinary use, however. No specific theory of emergence is im plied by this usage. Since some connectionists make use of the word 'em ergent' in its ordinary use intermingled with a more technical use, it is very important to tell the notions apart. E ventu ally, connectionist nets develop during their train ing phase -in a somewhat mini-evolutionary pro cesstheir 'soft' structures, by which I understand the specific distribution of link weights.31 The net's systemic properties discussed above supervene upon these structures. Now, the question arises whether this formation of structure is an interesting case of structure emergence. L e t's examine first the relationship between global net properties and their realization base, namely the net's structure and its part's properties. Considerations of connectionist net's architectures and their modes of operation reveal that only trained nets show typical m acroscopic properties such as 'rule following', 'schemata form ation', or 'pattern recognition'. Untrained nets do not have those (cognitive) properties, they have only the disposition to acquire them. M acroscopic proper ties of trained nets supervene upon both their given hard structure, and their acquired soft struc ture. They are fully reducible to the organization of the net in consideration, the properties of its units (namely their activation formula), and the properties of links consisting between its units (nameley distribution of weights, and formula for changing weights). If these quantities are known, the output-behavior of any net can be predicted exactly and explained. It is obvious that a net's parts, namely its units and the links between them, do not have any of those m acroscopic (cognitive) properties. So far, these properties a net acquires by training are typical systemic properties. How ever, since they are not irreducible systemic prop 31 The 'hard' structure of a net (its 'skeleton') is fixed by the number of units and the links between them. Usually, it is invariant.
erties, but are completely deducible from a net's structure, and its parts' and links' properties, a net's systemic properties are merely weakly em er gent. They are not synchronically emergent. Rumelhart and McClelland discuss in great de tail net properties which they call 'em ergent', and stress that connectionist approaches do not imply reductionistic, but interactionistic positions.
"We are simply trying to understand the essence of cognition as a property emerging from the in teractions of connected units in networks. We cer tainly believe in emergent phenomena in the sense of phenomena which could never be understood or predicted by a study of the lower level elements in isolation. Within the quoted texts, it is not em ergence in a technical sense that is being discussed, but rather a system's abilities to acquire systemic properties by self-organizational processes, which can be as cribed quite adequately by an ordinary use of the term 'emergent'. The temporary manifestation of schemata that were already latently 'in' the link's weights is interpreted, then, as an em ergent prop erty of the net. Connectionists, thus, mainly point to 'emergent rules' or 'emergent schem ata' to de marcate their position from 'classical' representationalism, accordingly to which all rules and sche mata have to be fed in explicitely (see H organ and Tienson, 1996).
There is a further feature of connectionist nets that provokes emergentist considerations: during the phase of training or learning a net runs through a mini-evolutionary processlink weights are adapted such that the net is enabled to handle the tasks it is supposed to master. Within 32 The term 'PDP model' refers to connectionist nets, too. It is an abbreviation for a kind of processing go ing on in them, namely 'parallel distributed pro cessing'.
this time the so-called 'soft structure' of the net develops.33 Only when the links' weights are ad justed adequately does a net has available desired macro-properties, that is, only then can it develop schemata, recognize patterns, or make use of rules. Those are not implemented explicitely as they are in symbol manipulating devices, but are extracted from given material. However, this is not a case of genuine structure emergence: not only does the distribution of weights result from deterministic principles, the changes of weights are even calcula ble exactly, if we know the learning rule, the acti vation formula, the unit's initial activation, the intial weights, and the inputs. Were this not the case, Rumelhart et al. could not have skipped the train ing phase to calculate weights 'on foot' and feed them into the system in advance. Even though we therefore should not speak of structure emergence in connectionist networks, re garding their soft structure, nets show a tremen dous plasticity, when compared with other objects, even when compared with other dynamical sys tems. Chemical compounds, to give an example, have no degrees of freedom to change their in ternal structure. In this respect connectionist nets differ clearly from seeming analogic cases such as diamonds, which were referred to by Rumelhart and McClelland to explain 'emergent' system's properties (cf. 1986, p. 128). Diamonds are not dy namical systems that realize only after a certain number of reiterated steps the property of being hard. The diamond's property of being hard is al ways manifest, it does not emerge.
To sum up, connectionist nets do not instantiate any stronger type of emergence. Neither are the net's properties synchronically emergent, nor is the formation of a net's soft structure a case of structure emergence. In the weak sense in which 33 The developing 'soft structure' depends on two factors, the net's hard structure, and the given inputs, that is external influences on it.
macroscopic properties of nets are emergent, all systemic properties of complex systems are em er gent. A difference to many other systems exists at best in the plasticity of nets and in their capacity to develop in a training phase by themselves ade quate 'attractors' to cope with given tasks. C orre sponding macroscopic properties will become manifest only temporarily during treatments. This second order property might justifiably be charac terized as 'phenomenological' emergence. Only some dynamical systems have this property.
Conclusion
In particular, I have distinguished three versions of emergentism: weak emergentism, (strong) syn chronic emergentism, and diachronic structure emergentism. Synchronic emergentism results from weak emergentism by adding the thesis of irreducibility. It turned out that this version of emergentism is important for the philosophy of mind, particularly for debating qualia. However, this does not establish that qualia are emergent phenomena in the strong sense. But they are good candidates for being so. Synergetics, on the other hand, does not treat any phenomenon as syn chronically emergent, nor does it treat novel struc tures as candidates for structure emergence. Phe nomena discussed by synergetics are emergent only in the weak sense. The same is true for prop erties of connectionist nets. As we have just seen, connectionist nets do not instantiate any stronger type of emergence. 
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